We investigate the relation between analyst stock recommendations and eight concurrently available variables that have predictive power for stock returns. We find that analysts generally pay little attention to the large sample predictive attributes of these variables. In seven out of eight cases, analysts' stock recommendations are directionally opposite to the variable's normative usage in returns prediction. In general, analysts exhibit a strong bias in favor of glamour stocks with growth characteristics.
Introduction
Researchers and practitioners have long been interested in understanding how the activities of financial analysts affect capital market efficiency. Currently in the United States, over 3,000 analysts work for more than 350 sell-side investment firms.
1 These analysts produce corporate earnings forecasts, write reports on individual companies, provide industry and sector analyses, and issue stock recommendations. Most prior studies have concluded that the information they produce promotes market efficiency by helping investors to value companies' assets more accurately.
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This study examines the information content of analyst stock recommendations. A stock recommendation represents an analyst's professional judgment on the expected price appreciation (or depreciation) of a given stock in the near future. As Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986, page 699) observed, these recommendations represent "one of the few cases in evaluating information content where the forecaster is recommending a clear and unequivocal course of action rather than producing an estimate of a number, the interpretation of which is up to the user." In short, these recommendations offer a rare opportunity to study analyst preferences across stocks at a given point in time.
Our study critically evaluates the investment value of analyst stock recommendations.
Specifically, we analyze the relation between analysts' stock recommendations and other concurrently available variables that also have predictive power for stock returns. Prior studies show analyst recommendations affect stock prices and trading volume at the time of their release, and that they have some ability to predict future returns. 3 However, little is known about the decision process that underpins these recommendations. We provide evidence on the type of firm preferred by analysts, and whether these preferences are warranted in light of future returns.
Our study is motivated by three main objectives. First, we document the preferences of sell-side analysts by providing a descriptive profile of firms that receive stronger recommendations, as well as firms that analysts tend to upgrade (downgrade). Second, we compare the return prediction performance of the analysts to the performance of other predictive variables gleaned from the academic literature. Our goal in this analysis is more prescriptive in nature. To the extent that analysts do not fully incorporate large sample predictive patterns in expected returns, we aim to develop a decision aid that will assist their efforts. Finally, we critically evaluate the usefulness of analyst recommendations in returns prediction after controlling for other predictive variables. In this third stage, our goal is to assist buy-side market participants in evaluating the role and relevance of analyst recommendations in their investment decisions. Specifically, we are interested in whether fundamental analysts can be helpful to quantitative investors, and if so, for what types of firms.
Our investigation proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we document key characteristics of firms preferred by sell-side analysts. This part of our study is similar in spirit to recent studies by Finger and Landsman (1999) and Stickel (1999) . However, given our interest in the role of analyst recommendations in investment decisions, our focus is on explanatory variables that have a demonstrated ability to predict future returns. Our tests are also designed to ensure these variables represent fresh news, which was recently released at the time when the stock recommendations themselves were issued.
We find that analysts generally prefer growth stocks that display glamour characteristics.
Stocks that receive higher recommendations have positive price momentum and high trading volume (as measured by the turnover ratio). They exhibit greater past sales growth, and are expected to grow their earnings faster in the future. These stocks also have higher valuation multiples, more positive (income increasing) accounting accruals, and are investing a greater proportion of their total assets in capital expenditures.
Overall, analysts favor growth firms that appear over-valued by traditional valuation metrics.
In the second part of the study, we evaluate the implications of these analyst preferences for the returns prediction ability of their recommendations. Like earlier studies (e.g., Elton et al. (1986) , Womack (1996) , and Barber et al. (2000) ), we find that analyst recommendations have predictive power for subsequent returns. Specifically, firms that receive more favorable (less favorable) recommendations earn significantly higher (lower) market adjusted returns over the next six to 12 months. This result holds across all four measures of analyst recommendations: consensus recommendations, individual recommendations, and the changes in each of these variables.
More importantly, we find that analysts' recommendations generally run counter to a predictive variable's normative usage in returns prediction. For seven out of our eight predictive variables, the correlation with analysts' stock recommendations is directionally opposite to the variable's correlation with future returns. In multivariate regressions, we find that these explanatory variables can explain a significant proportion of the crosssectional variation in analyst recommendations. However, most of these variables are correlated with analyst recommendations with the "wrong" sign, suggesting that analysts do not incorporate the large-sample predictive attributes of these variables in their recommendations.
The ability of analysts' stock recommendations to predict future returns is surprising, in light of their general disagreement with the other predictive variables. In the last part of the paper, we examine the ability of analyst recommendations to predict returns after controlling for the other eight variables. We find that these eight variables have strong predictive power for returns over our sample period. However, analyst recommendations consistently exhibit incremental predictive power after including these variables.
The predictive power of recommendation changes (revisions) is reduced, but not eliminated, after controlling for the other predictive variables. The predictive power of the level of analyst recommendation actually increases after controlling for the other variables. This effect is most pronounced for firms shunned by the quantitative variables.
These findings suggest that some of the information contained in analyst stock recommendations, particularly the level of these recommendations, is orthogonal to the information in the other predictive signals.
In sum, our results show that analyst recommendations do not fully integrate the available information about expected cross-sectional returns. In fact, the stocks they recommend most highly tend to bear some of the least favorable characteristics in terms of the other predictive signals. Nevertheless, their recommendations have incremental predictive value for subsequent returns. In our concluding section, we discuss implications of these findings for analysts, and investors who rely on their recommendations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes the motivation for this study and develops our hypotheses in the context of prior studies.
Section 3 presents our research methodology and sample selection procedures. In Section 4, we present our empirical results. Section 5 summarizes our findings and discusses some of their implications.
Motivation and Hypotheses
Our research is primarily motivated by an underlying desire to better understand the judgment and decision process behind analysts' stock recommendations. Although several recent academic studies show that analyst recommendations have predictive power for subsequent returns (e.g., Elton et al. (1986 ), Womack (1996 , and Barber et al. (2000) ), our knowledge of how analysts arrive at these recommendations is startlingly rudimentary. By presenting a descriptive profile of the firms preferred by analysts, we shed light on analysts' consideration of various financial information cues in developing their stock recommendations. 4 Our sample consists of firms that have analyst coverage, and have already at least one prior stock recommendation. Therefore, our evidence may not extent to analysts' decision to commence or terminate coverage. For an analysis of these decisions, see McNichols and O'Brien (1997) and O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) .
The measures we consider are variables that have a demonstrated ability to forecast cross-sectional returns in prior studies. Our tests serve a dual purpose. First, they allow us to examine the extent to which the predictive power of analyst forecasts is due to analysts' tendency to issue recommendations consistent with various investment strategies. Second, they help us to understand the extent to which analysts fully incorporate concurrently available information in their recommendations. These results should help investors to better understand the usefulness (and limitations) of analyst stock recommendations in investment decisions.
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Our study links the literature on analyst recommendations to prior studies on the predictability of cross-sectional returns. The eight predictive variables we examine, discussed in more detail in the next section, are nominated by prior studies in accounting and finance. We evaluate the predictive ability of analyst recommendations in light of these eight variables. Womack (1996) and Elton et al. (1986) show that firms that receive buy (sell) recommendations tend to earn higher (lower) abnormal returns in the subsequent one to six months. Barber et al. (2000) extend the investigation to consensus recommendations, documenting the potential to earn higher returns by buying the most highly recommended stocks and short selling the least favorably recommended stocks.
We investigate the extent to which this price drift phenomenon is due to analysts' tendency to issue recommendations consistent with other investment strategies.
Using recent (largely post-1994) data, we confirm prior findings that analyst recommendations predict subsequent returns. More importantly, we show that analysts' preferences, as expressed in these recommendations, are largely orthogonal to the other predictive variables. Controlling for the other variables, the stocks preferred by analysts continue to outperform the stocks they shun. These findings suggest analysts consider a different set of information about the companies that they recommend. 
Predictive Variables
We consider eight variables that have demonstrated their ability to predict cross-sectional returns. The Appendix contains detailed information on how each variable is computed.
These variables are also summarized below.
2.1.1 Technical Indicators -The first two explanatory variables are RETP6MO (price momentum) and VOLP6MO (trading volume). RETP6MO is the market-adjusted return for each stock in the six months preceding the month of the recommendation. Prior studies (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ) show that firms with higher (lower) price momentum earn higher (lower) returns over the next 12 months. VOLP6MO is the average daily volume turnover for the stock in the six months preceding the month of the recommendation. 7 Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that high (low) volume stocks exhibit glamour (value) characteristics, and earn lower (higher) returns in subsequent months. If analysts based their recommendations on the predictive attributes of price momentum and trading volume, we would expect past winners and lower-volume stocks (past losers and higher-volume stocks) to receive the most favorable (least favorable) recommendations.
2.1.2 Valuation Multiples -We also consider two valuation multiples: EP (the earningsto-price ratio) and BP (the book-to-price ratio). Both variables are widely used in valuebased investment strategies. Starting with Basu (1977) , a number of academic studies show that high EP firms subsequently outperform low EP firms. Similarly, Fama and French (1992) , among others, show that high BP firms subsequently earn higher returns than low BP firms. Academic opinions differ on whether these higher returns represent 6 Our study is also tangentially related Abarbanell and Lehavy (1999) and Bradshaw (2000) . These studies focus on the relation between analyst recommendations and their earnings forecasts. Our main focus is on the task of returns prediction. 7 The trading volume for NASDAQ stocks is inflated by inter-dealer trades. To adjust for the is effect, we deflate the turnover measure for NASDAQ stocks by a factor of 2 in computing VOLP6MO.
contrarian profits or a fair reward for risk. 8 In either case, if analysts pay attention to the predictive attribute of these multiples, we would expect high EP (and high BP) firms to receive more favorable recommendations.
2.1.3 Growth Indicators -We include two growth indicators: LTG (the mean analyst forecast of expect long-term growth in earnings) and SGI (the rate of growth in sales over the past year). Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show that firms with high past growth in sales earn lower subsequent returns. They argue that high growth firms are glamour stocks that are over-valued by the market. 9 In the same spirit, La Porta (1996) shows that firms with high forecasted earnings growth (high LTG firms) also earn lower subsequent returns. If analysts rely on these large sample results, low SGI (and low LTG) firms should receive more favorable recommendations.
2.1.4 Fundamental Signals -Finally, we include two fundamental signals from the accounting literature: TATA (total accruals divided by total assets) and CFITA (Cash flow from investments divided by total assets). Sloan (1996) shows that firms with more positive (income increasing) accruals earn lower subsequent returns. He argues that the accrual-component of earnings is less persistent, and that the market does not take this effect into account in a timely fashion. Beneish, Lee, and Tarpley (2000) show that growth firms with high CFITA also tend to earn lower returns. Lakonishok et al. (1994) use a variable that measures the change in sales over the past five years. Our variable is the one-year growth rate in sales, which Beneish (1999) shows is useful in detecting firms that manipulate their earnings. 10 These prior studies are generally based on pre-1995 data. Since most of our observations are more recent (post-1994) , our results also represent out-of-sample tests of these earlier findings.
is known about large-sample tendencies in expected returns. To the extent that analysts are either explicitly or intuitively aware of these tendencies, these variables may be reflected in their stock recommendations. If so, we would expect the variables to be correlated with analyst recommendations in the same way they are correlated with future returns.
Sample Selection and Research Design

Sample Selection
Our initial sample consists of First Call stock recommendations issued during the period from January 1993 to April 1998, inclusively. We require that each sample firm be listed as a common stock in the CRSP database and that its accounting information be available on the merged COMPUSTAT database. These data constraints ensure the availability of basic financial information for each firm in our sample.
We paid particular attention to the timing of the analysts' stock recommendations relative to the availability of other investment signals. To ensure comparability across firms, we focus on companies with a December fiscal year end. For each firm, we select the first stock recommendation issued in the second quarter of the next fiscal year -i.e., in the three-month period from April 1st to June 30th of year t+1 -that also has a prior recommendation from the same brokerage firm. Having only one observation per firmyear avoids the problem of non-independent observations (due, for example, to "herding" among analysts) that can inflate test statistics. recommendation. These procedures ensure that: (1) the latest annual financial statements are available to the analysts at the time of their recommendation, (2) this financial information is reasonably fresh for all sample firms, (3) firms just added to the analysts' following are excluded, and (4) future returns reflect potentially tradable strategies.
We examine two types of recommendations -the first individual analyst's recommendation during the recommendation collection period, and the consensus (mean) recommendation on the same date. Individual recommendations are fresher, and more likely to reflect recent news. However, consensus judgments are generally less noisy than the individual experts that comprise the consensus. We report key results for both recommendation metrics. In addition, we investigate the change in (revision to) both types of recommendations.
Data Description
Our data collection procedure yielded a total of 4,895 individual recommendations (and related consensus recommendations) over six years. Table 1 decreases. In our sample, analysts were slightly more likely to downgrade a firm than upgrade it (2,214 versus 1,929). Around 15% (752 out of 4,895) of the individual recommendations were unchanged from the previous recommendation.
Panel C provides evidence on the negative correlation between the level of the prior consensus recommendation, and changes in the consensus. A firm that received a relatively high (low) prior recommendation is much more likely to be down (up) graded.
For example, 51.3% of the firms in the top quintile in terms of the prior consensus were then in the bottom quintile in terms of changes in the consensus recommendation.
Conversely, 48.6% of the firms in the bottom quintile of prior consensus recommendations were then in the top changes quintile. In subsequent tests, we control for this strong negative correlation. days old when it is revised. Figure 2b reports the average number of days outstanding by recommendation type. It shows that across all five categories of recommendations, the average age of the recommendations is fairly stable -between 206 and 286 days.
Apparently analysts typically revise their recommendations every 6 to 10 months. This evidence provides justification for examining future returns over a similar holding period.
It also offers some assurance that our data do not contain redundant or omitted recommendation revisions. Table 3 provides evidence on the predictive ability of analyst stock recommendations.
Empirical Results
Analyst Recommendations and Future Returns
We find similar results for 3, 9, or 12 month holding periods. In general, results are strongest for returns over the first three-month holding, and gradually weakens over time.
However, for parsimony, we only report results for a six-month holding period. Recall that each observation represents a single firm-year, thus avoiding analyst "herding"
behavior and other non-independence problems.
Panel A documents the Spearman rank correlation between the four recommendation measures and market-adjusted returns for the six months following the month of recommendation (RETF6MO). All four measures are positively correlated with future returns. The level of the recommendation is less correlated with subsequent returns than the changes in recommendation, with the consensus recommendation having the lowest correlation.
The next two panels report the mean and median market-adjusted return by analyst recommendation level (Panel B), and by the change in analyst recommendation (Panel 13 Two possible concerns with recommendation data are: 1) What appear as revisions in the data may not be new recommendations, but are automatically generated by the data capture system, and 2) First Call estimate files only capture recommendations when there has been an earnings estimate revision (Welch, 1999) . The first problem results in too many revisions, the second results in too few. As discussed with S. Levine (Director of Quantitative Research at First Call Corporation), the recommendation dataset we used contains only recommendation revisions that are instigated by a brokerage firm, and captures recommendation revisions without requiring an accompanying estimate revision.
C). For all four measures, firms that receive more favorable recommendations (buys or upgrades) earn higher subsequent returns than firms that receive less favorable recommendations (sells/holds or downgrades). For the consensus recommendations, the mean difference between top and bottom quintile is around 3% over the next six months, with most of the returns coming from the under-performance of the least preferred firms.
For individual recommendations, top and bottom groups differed on average by around 4% over the next six months, again with most of the difference coming from the poor showing of the sell/hold firms. Overall, our findings confirm prior studies that show analyst recommendations have predictive power for subsequent returns. Table 4 reports the relation between future returns and other investment strategies. Panel A shows the Spearman rank correlation between each variable and RETF6MO. Over our sample period, all eight variables are significantly correlated with future returns in the direction reported in prior studies. In general, firms with positive price momentum (RETP6MO) and low trading volume (VOLP6MO) earned higher market-adjusted returns over the next six months. Similarly, high EP and BP firms, low LTG and SGI firms, low CFITA and TATA firms, earned higher subsequent returns. The highest absolute correlations are with price momentum (RETP6MO), the expected long-term growth (LTG), the earnings-to-price ratio (EP), and past trading volume (VOLP6MO).
Other Investment Strategies
These correlation levels range from +0.156 (RETP6MO) to -0.118 (LTG).
We also compute an aggregate indicator measure (FScore) and evaluate its predictive power for future returns. To construct this variable, we first convert each of the eight individual indicators into a binary signal. For variables that are positively (negatively) correlated with future returns, we assigned a value of 1 if it is higher (lower) than a threshold value, and 0 otherwise. Missing values are coded as ½.
The cutoff value for each variable is listed in the Appendix. These values are determined based on general information gleaned from past periods. For example, we used 0% for the market-adjusted return price momentum measure (RETP6MO). We used 22 basis points as the cutoff for trading volume because it represented the mean daily turnover on the NYSE for the 10 years prior to the sample period (from the 1996 NYSE Fact Book).
The FScore for each firm-year is the sum of the binary explanatory variables.
Under the heading "Distribution", Panel A reports the percent of total observations that received a value of "1", or "1/2", or "0", for each explanatory variable. FScore. During our sample period, a majority of U.S. firms under-performed the valueweighted market index. However, firms in the top three FScore groups out-performed the market by a mean of 1.78% over the next six months. Conversely, firms in the bottom three FScore groups had a mean market-adjusted return of -5.28% over the next six months. The difference in mean returns between the top and bottom groups (HighLow) is 7.06%. The difference in median returns is 10.65% over six months. Both are statistically significant at less than 1% using two-tailed tests. Clearly, FScore is a useful predictor of returns during our sample period.
Analyst Recommendations and Investment Strategies
Thus far, we have established the predictive ability of the eight investment indicators in our sample. We have also documented the predictive ability of the analyst stock recommendations. In this section, we document the relation between analyst recommendations and the predictive variables nominated by the investment strategies. Table 4A ). Under the heading "Actual Direction" we report the direction of correlation between that variable and the analysts' consensus recommendation. We report the Spearman rank correlation between each variable and the consensus recommendation. In addition, we provide the Wilcoxon Chi-square statistic for a test of the null that the median value is the same for the top and bottom consensus recommendation quintile.
The most striking result in Table 5 is the consistency with which analyst stock recommendations contradict the expected normative usage of these variables. In seven out of eight cases, the actual direction of the analysts' preference is opposite to the normative direction for predicting future stock returns. Analysts prefer stocks with high recent turnover (trading volume) over stocks with low turnover. They also prefer low EP, low BP, high LTG, high SGI, high CFITA, and high TATA stocks. In fact, the only variable that analysts seem to get "right" is price momentum -they prefer stocks that have been recent winners over stocks that have been recent losers. Tables 6 and 7 provide additional evidence in a multivariate setting. These tables report results when each recommendation variable is regressed on the eight explanatory variables. 15 Table 6 reports results when the dependent variable is the level of the recommendation. With few exceptions, Table 5 results hold in the multivariate setting.
Panel A shows that the continuous version of these eight variables explains 27% of the cross-sectional variation in the consensus recommendation. However, except for RETP6MO and EP, these variables load with the opposite sign from their normative usage. The results are similar using the binary signals. In fact, the FScore is strongly negatively correlated with analyst recommendations, with an r-square of 13.1%.
Moving from the consensus recommendation (Panel A of Table 6 ) to individual recommendations (Panel B of Table 6 ) reduces the overall explanatory power of the model, but not the relation between most individual signals and the recommendations.
Overall, Table 6 shows that only RETP6MO, EP, and TATA appear with the right sign. In sum, these findings show that analyst recommendations tend to be negatively correlated with the other predictive variables in their normative usage. Given these findings, it seems unlikely that the predictive power of analyst recommendations is due to their reliance on information cues derived from these variables. We explore this question more directly in the next section.
The role of analyst recommendations in returns prediction
In this section, we evaluate the role of analyst recommendations in returns prediction, after controlling for the other predictive variables. Table 8 . In all four panels, the Best-High group earns higher returns than the Worst-Low group. The returns differential ranges from 7.1% to 18.6% over the next six months, which is greater than returns earned by considering either signal alone. Table 8 . In addition, Figure 3 reports the results for 3 to 15 month holding periods.
The main results are robust to these variations in the holding period.
It is clear from these graphs that all four types of analyst recommendations have some predictive power for returns, particularly over the next 3 to 9 months (see Best-Worst results in each graph). However, these four measures differ in terms of their incremental contribution in combination with FScore (see Combined results in each graph). Clearly the level variables contribute more to the combined strategy than the change variables.
The level of the consensus forecast, in particular, seems to have the potential to significantly enhance the predictive power of the simple FScore strategy.
Finally, Table 9 In sum, Tables 8 and 9 show that the predictive power of analyst stock recommendations does not derive from their correlation with the other explanatory variables. Despite the fact that analysts tend to go "against the odds" in 7 out of 8 cases, their recommendations seem to offer some information useful in predicting near-term stock returns (over the next 6 months). The incremental usefulness for returns prediction is most pronounced for the level of the consensus recommendation.
Conclusion
In making a stock recommendation, financial analysts explicitly express their expectation about the relative near-term return performance of a given firm. In this study, we examine the relation of their recommendations to other concurrently available public information. In particular, we focus on variables that prior studies show have some predictive power for future returns. Our goal is to better understand how the activities of financial analysts affect capital market efficiency.
We find that analysts prefer growth stocks that appear over-valued by traditional measures. The stocks that receive more favorable recommendations typically have more positive price momentum, higher trading volume (turnover), higher past and projected growth, more positive accounting accruals, and more aggressive capital expenditures. In short, analysts seem to recommend a set of stocks that are quite different from the stocks that would have been nominated by quantitative investment strategies. In fact, the correlation between analyst recommendations and an aggregate measure of these variables is reliably negative.
Despite its negative correlation with these variables in their normative usage, analyst stock recommendations still have significant predictive power for returns. Controlling for the other variables, we find that firms favored by analysts tend to outperform firms that are less favored. In fact, the explanatory power of the mean analyst recommendation increases when it is used in conjunction with the other variables. This finding suggests that the return-relevant information contained in analyst recommendations is, to some degree, orthogonal to the information contained in the other variables.
Our analysis sheds no further light on the exact nature of the incremental information that analysts incorporate in their recommendations -information which the market appears to react to with a lag. Since we do not control for industry-related effects, it is possible that their stock recommendations reflect news about a firm's competitive position in its industry. These recommendations may also capture qualitative aspects of a firm's operations (e.g., managerial abilities, strategic alliances, intangible assets, or other growth opportunities) that do not appear in the quantitative signals we examine. The evidence is at least consistent with the analysts' claim that they bring new information to market.
An alternative hypothesis is that the recommendations themselves cause the subsequent price drift through the publicity surrounding them, and the subsequent marketing of these stocks by the affiliated sales forces. In this scenario, analysts do not actually bring new information to market via their research efforts. One way to test this hypothesis is to check for return reversals over longer horizons. However, given our limited sample period, it would be difficult to distinguish this scenario from the one in which analysts are facilitating the price formation process. We regard this as an interesting area for further research.
Our results suggest that financial analysts may be able to improve their stock recommendations by paying more attention to the large sample attributes of expected returns. We have identified a number of specific signals that analysts do not generally incorporate into their recommendations. If their disregard for these signals is not deliberate, our results may help analysts to improve their future recommendations.
Specifically, our results suggest that if analysts want to generate recommendations with greater predictive power for returns, they should grant more favorable recommendations to firms with lower trading volume, higher EP and BP ratios, lower LTG and SGI measures, more negative (income decreasing) accruals, and lower capital expenditures.
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From an investment perspective, our results suggest analyst recommendations play a dual role in the price formation process. On the one hand, they appear over-enamored with growth and glamour stocks. To the extent that their opinion affects public sentiment, this evidence is at least consistent with the view that they contribute to noise trading in the market. On the other hand, these findings suggest sell-side recommendations can still play a useful role in quantitative strategies. When analyst recommendations conflict with a combined investment signal (the FScore), the FScore dominates. However, within individual FScore categories, the recommendations are incrementally useful in returns prediction. The consensus recommendation, in particular, has significant ability to forecast near-term (3 to 9 month) cross-sectional returns.
In contemplating its usage in investment strategies, readers need to consider risk and transaction costs issues not fully explored in this study. It is possible that the top quintile stocks are riskier than the bottom quintile stocks along some unknown dimension. This possibility is made less likely by our inclusion of a wide set of control variables known to be associated with expected returns. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out. In addition, we have not included transaction costs, which will vary by investment style.
To summarize, our results suggest that fundamental analysts and investment houses that employ large-sample quantitative techniques could each learn something from the other.
Behavioral research shows that, in many cases, the combination of a human decisionmaker and a mechanical decision-aid produces the best performance (see, e.g., Blattberg
and Hoch (1990) analysts' recommendations may also be hindered by psychological factors, such as analysts' relative confidence in their own judgments (Nelson, Krische, and Bloomfield (2000)).
Fama, E. 
APPENDIX: Investment Signals
This appendix provides a detailed description of the eight investment signals used in the study. 
FIGURE 1b.
Timeline depicting data period for the analysts' recommendation and related market variables This table provides descriptive statistics on the analyst recommendations in our sample. Each individual recommendation is reverse-scored numerically from 5 (strong buy) to 1 (strong sell). The consensus recommendation is the average of all outstanding recommendations at the time the individual recommendation was issued. Panel A reports summary statistics for the level of the recommendation. Panel B reports summary statistics for the change in the recommendation. Panel C provides evidence on the correlation between prior consensus levels and changes in the consensus recommendation. The shadings in the last panel signify that greater than 20% of the observations in the conditional distribution appears in that cell. This table examines the correlation between analyst recommendations and future returns. Future returns are defined as the market-adjusted return in the six months after the month of the recommendation (RETF6MO). Four different measures of analyst recommendations are used: the consensus recommendation (CONS), the individual recommendation (REC), the change in the consensus (CHGCONS), and the change in the individual recommendation (CHGREC). Panel A reports the Spearman rank correlation between each analyst recommendation measure and future returns. We report results for both a continuous measure and a categorical measure of analyst recommendation (see Table 2 ) Panel B reports future returns for firms grouped by their analyst recommendation, and Panel C reports future returns grouped by the change in the analyst recommendation. ***, **, * indicate two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 4 . FScore, a composite signal, is also explained in Table 4 . ***, **, * signify two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 4 . FScore, a composite signal, is also explained in Table 4 . ***, **, * signify two-sided statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
